INNE EBOOKI AUTORA
Autor:
Format:
ibuk
The books’ goal is to answer the question: Do the weaknesses of value-free economics imply the need for a paradigm shift? The author synthesizes criticisms from different perspectives (descriptive and methodological). Special attention is paid to choices over time, because in this area value-free economics has the most problems. In that context, the enriched concept of multiple self is proposed and investigated. However, it is not enough to present the criticisms towards value-free economics. For scientists, a bad paradigm is better than no paradigm. Therefore, the author considers whether value-based economics with normative approaches such as economics of happiness, capability approach, libertarian paternalism, and the concept of multiple self can be the alternative paradigm for value-free economics. This book is essential reading to everyone interested in the current state of economics as a discipline.
Rok wydania | 2021 |
---|---|
Liczba stron | 230 |
Kategoria | Inne |
Wydawca | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu |
ISBN-13 | 978-83-7695-853-8 |
Numer wydania | 1 |
Język publikacji | angielski |
Informacja o sprzedawcy | ePWN sp. z o.o. |
INNE EBOOKI AUTORA
POLECAMY
Ciekawe propozycje
Spis treści
Introduction | 7 |
1. The origins of value-free economics 17 | |
1.1. Introduction | 17 |
1.2. Pareto turn – economics and psychology | 19 |
1.3. Robbins and value-free economics | 22 |
1.4. Positive versus normative approach | 27 |
1.5. Conclusions | 32 |
2. Lakatosian perspective on Becker’s economic approach | 34 |
2.1. Introduction | 34 |
2.2. Becker’s economic approach as scientific research programme | 38 |
2.3. Becker’s methodology | 41 |
2.4. Problems with instrumental rationality and utility maximization | 44 |
2.5. Becker’s unsuccessful escape from tautology | 52 |
2.6. Conclusions | 55 |
3. Economics of happiness | 59 |
3.1. Introduction | 59 |
3.2. Subjective well-being | 63 |
3.3. The criticism of revealed preference theory | 67 |
3.4. Economics of happiness – general insights | 77 |
3.5. Objective well-being approaches | 78 |
3.6. Conclusions | 87 |
4. The conception of multiple self. Reason versus emotions | 90 |
4.1. Introduction | 90 |
4.2. Personal identity and economics | 90 |
4.3. The conception of multiple self | 100 |
4.4. The conception of multiple self over time | 103 |
4.5. Weakness of will | 106 |
4.6. Conclusions | 111 |
5. Philosophy of science and value-free economics | 113 |
5.1. Introduction | 113 |
5.2. Positivist methodology of economics | 121 |
5.3. Weber and value-free economics | 126 |
5.4. Consequentialism versus deontology | 130 |
6. The capability approach | 137 |
6.1. Introduction | 137 |
6.2. The criticism of neoclassical economics | 137 |
6.3. Functionings and capabilities | 140 |
6.4. Freedom as an intrinsic value | 143 |
6.5. Reason and autonomy | 147 |
6.6. The criticism of the capability approach | 153 |
6.7. Conclusions | 157 |
7. Libertarian paternalism. The discussion on freedom and well-being | 159 |
7.1. Introduction | 159 |
7.2. Psychological background | 161 |
7.3. Libertarian paternalism | 163 |
7.3.1. Introduction | 163 |
7.3.2. Choice architecture | 164 |
7.3.3. Default option versus freedom | 168 |
7.3.4. Some constraints on libertarian paternalism | 170 |
7.4. Libertarian paternalism in the light of capability approach | 171 |
7.5. The criticism of libertarian paternalism | 172 |
7.5.1. Introduction | 172 |
7.5.2. The concept of purified preferences. The problems with the inner agent | 173 |
7.5.3. Paternalism is not inevitable | 183 |
7.5.4. Libertarian paternalism does not provide freedom | 186 |
7.6. Conclusions | 193 |
Conclusions | 195 |
References | 202 |